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Summary.
Mainstream  economics  owes  its  influence  to  three  factors.  (i)  Its  claim  to  show  how 
unfettered market forces can optimise the allocation of resources. (ii) A model of motivation 
and behaviour that predicts advantages for a much-reduced role for the public sector. (iii) A 
very large, long-standing and ongoing public relations campaign, financed mainly by large  
business organizations, to promote these ideas as true and sound.  Evidence is presented that  
the  bases  of  (i)  and  (ii)  are  artefacts  of  the  stringent  process  of  simplification  used  to 
condense complex reality into simple models (‘complex’ and ‘simple’ are defined). 
In the former case, fuzzy logic and genetic algorithms are used to rework a more  
realistic (and more complex) version of the basic model of competitive markets, resulting in  
an equilibrium significantly different from the one predicted from the usual static analysis,  
and which is not compatible with the theorems about the optimality of competitive equilibria.  
This  study  also  shows  that,  with  methodology  that  demands  much  less  stringent  
simplification, the Walrasian problem of how a market could attain equilibrium is readily  
solved. 
In the case of (ii), research in the fields of management, political science, theoretical  
and field biology, and in neuroscience shows that the belief that economic rationality will  
necessarily drive actors in politics and the public sector to misbehave in ways that give the  
private sector an inherent, strong advantage in efficiency and effectiveness is wrong. 
The possible extension of the methodology applied to (i) to other technical aspects of  
economics (including international  trade theory,  and development),  and the limitations to  
usefulness  of  theory  in  political  domains,  are  both  discussed;  the  philosophical  case  for 
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laissez-faire policies is considered briefly; and the prospects for change in the way we view  
the economic domain are reviewed. 
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1. Introduction.
The  field  of  political  economy  is  currently  dominated  by  mainstream  economics 
(MSE), which consists of two parts. Its core – which gives it intellectual respectability 
–  is  the  body of  theory  and  assumptions  that  support  the  conclusion  that  market 
forces,  on  their  own,  are  capable  of  ensuring  that  our  resources  are,  in  some 
reasonable sense, put to the best possible use, nationally or globally. A specific and 
very simple model of motivation and organizations underpins this core; and this has 
developed into the second element of MSE, which takes its purest and most extreme 
form in public choice theory (this is discussed later). It is difficult to over-estimate the 
influence of this combination. Its influence on public administration and development 
is particularly strong, and this is reflected, for example, in the way that ‘public sector 
reform’ is defined, and in claims that freeing-up the international markets for goods, 
services, and capital is a necessary and sufficient condition for improving the lot of 
the world’s poor.  
However, it is equally difficult to ignore the critics of MSE. Some focus on 
mitigating the human consequences of MSE, which they judge to be unacceptable; in 
the UK, New Economics Foundation and the Green Economics Institute are examples 
of institutional critics of this school. Unfortunately,  this form of criticism seems to 
have failed to generate any dialogue with those who are convinced that this strong 
form of  MSE represents  the world sufficiently  well  for  most  (or  even all)  policy 
purposes.  Others  attack  weaknesses  in  the  internal  logic  of  the  MSE case.  For  a 
summary of these internal criticisms, see [1]; many of these critics are leading figures 
within  the  economics  profession,  who  are  cautious  about  over-emphasizing  the 
optimising power of market forces. However, they also appear to despair of finding 
methods  that  can  handle  more  realistic  versions  of  key  economic  questions; 
international trade, income distribution, and development are the most important of 
these. 
This paper develops a third line of criticism: that the core models of MSE are 
over-simplified to the extent that  they cannot reproduce many phenomena that are 
important  in  real  economies,  and  they  are  therefore  likely to  generate  misleading 
policy prescriptions.  This style of criticism dates back to Schumpeter’s complaints 
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about the ‘Ricardian Vice’, i.e., the construction of models that exclude significant 
aspects of the problem in the interests of mathematical tractability [2]; and there is an 
important dissenting tradition in economics that is deeply concerned about this [3]. 
However, it is only very recently that tools that can handle the additional complexity 
of more realistic models have become available. 
This last type of criticism – which this essay attempts to elaborate – has a 
constructive  aspect.  It  implies  that  some  fairly  specific  enhancements  to  our 
conventional  toolkit  are  needed,  and  one  approach  to  providing  this  additional 
capability  is  demonstrated  below,  where  the  relevant  methodology  (detailed  in 
Section 4) is applied to the most fundamental of the core models (that of perfectly 
competitive markets). This methodology does not require such stringent simplification 
of reality to ensure tractability; and the results of applying it are substantially different 
from the standard ones. The essay also attempts to link this research with other work 
(based on similar methods) that impinges on mainstream models of motivation and 
organizations. Taken together, this body of work and ideas shares a significant feature 
of MSE: it claims not only to provide a framework for technical economics, but also 
to  provide  models  of  motivation,  management,  and  institutions.  These  two 
perspectives differ in fundamental ways that affect much of economic practice and 
theory-building; the essay concludes with a brief comment on this, and the prospects 
for change. 
2. The Assumptions: Complexity versus Simplicity.
The real world is complex, in the very specific sense explained below, whereas the 
core models of MSE (of competitive markets, international trade, etc) are simple, in 
an  equally  specific  sense  (and  despite  their  mathematical  sophistication).  Simple 
systems are static or have linear dynamics (and therefore have no threshold effects, 
tipping-points,  or  positive  feedback,  etc.)  We  understand  them  perfectly  and 
completely; their key variables are all quantitative; and, while they may be subject to 
risk, that is also quantifiable and stable. In simple systems, causal chains are short and 
unidirectional,  and transactions  of all  kinds  can take place  instantaneously;  in  the 
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simple models used in MSE, time is either ignored entirely, or it is treated as strictly 
continuous, and any memory effects are assumed to be short and simple in form [4]. If 
simple models contain more than one agent, those agents are identical. 
Complex systems differ  from simple ones, in all  these features.  They have 
nonlinear dynamics. At best, our understanding of them is approximate; and some or 
all of their key variables are qualitative. They may be subject to quantifiable risk, but 
they are also subject to more radical kinds of uncertainty, some of which arises from 
our  ignorance;  this  is  the  kind  of  uncertainty  that  both  Frank  Knight  and  John 
Maynard Keynes were concerned about [5]. Some uncertainty also derives directly 
from nonlinearity: nonlinear processes quite often generate time-series data (for both 
natural  and  economic  processes)  that  are  marked  by  apparently  causeless  –  and 
sometimes large – shifts in typical value and variability. They also show deviations 
from  the  average  much  larger  than  those  predicted  by  the  Gaussian2 probability 
distribution  usually  assumed  in  mainstream  work  on  risk;  this  often  gravely 
understates  the  probability  of  ruinous  events  (sometimes  by  many  orders  of 
magnitude). These deviations are often associated with long memory effects [6, 7]; 
and they have contributed to a number of financial  debacles,  including the LTCM 
affair [8] (although other factors were also involved in that case).  
The above-listed features  combine  to  create  ambiguity:  historical  data  may 
prove misleading, and facts are often open to conflicting interpretations. The data on 
rational  expectations  –  the  doctrine  that  agents  learn,  rapidly  and  accurately,  the 
properties of the economic systems in which they live, so that policy intervention is 
largely futile  – provide a good example [9]. In complex systems, transactions and 
transmission  of  information  take  time  (and  it  is  usually  calendar  time  –  i.e., 
continuous time, with gaps for holidays, etc – that is significant).  Cause-and-effect 
chains ramify extensively, and often contain indirect circular linkages. Populations of 
agents in complex systems are always heterogeneous. Fully complex systems often 
have emergent features, i.e., ones that cannot be predicted from knowledge of their 
2 ‘Gaussian’ is used here, rather than the usual description, ‘normal’. Many real economic time series 
data are neither Gaussian nor ‘normal’, especially as far as the risk of extreme events is concerned. 
However, both the Gaussian distribution and the more realistic multi-fractal distribution described by 
Mandelbrot and Hudson (see [6]) are members of the same fundamental family, the L-stable 
distributions.  
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component elements [10]. However, even sub-complex systems (with only some of 
the above characteristics) often do not behave like simple ones. For example, models 
that rely on the assumption of strictly continuous time may fail to match the behaviour 
of the corresponding real systems (operating in calendar time) in important ways [11]. 
Ormerod  (see  [1])  also  stresses  the  theoretical  vulnerability  of  simple  models  to 
apparently minor, innocent deviations from reality. 
 
Simple  linear  models  do  not,  in  general,  reproduce  the  behaviour  and 
properties of complex dynamical systems at all well; and while both real systems and 
their models can be complex, there are no real simple systems in economics or public 
policy. 
3. The Questions Investigated. 
Ultimately, all the core theorems of MSE are derived from models that are in a state 
of supply/ demand equilibrium. The question of how a given collection of firms and 
consumers  reach equilibrium (‘the  issue  of  the  Walrasian  Crier’)  has  never  been 
properly resolved, even for the case of simple models [12]. If these equilibria are not 
actually attainable, their properties – however desirable – are irrelevant. (This is not a 
destructive quibble: many nonlinear dynamical systems can be shown to possess static 
equilibria which, however, cannot be reached from any credible starting point by any 
series  of  technically  permissible  steps  [13].  Mathematical  economists  tend  to 
acknowledge this possibility, but they then fail to address it in any but the simplest 
cases; see, for example, [14].) The outstanding questions are, then:
− What rules would intelligent, profit-driven firms choose to adopt, as a result of 
their  experiences  in  an  evolving  market,  to  regulate  their  businesses  in  a 
complex environment? 
− Do these rules differ from those attributed to firms in perfectly competitive 
markets? 
− Do they  result  in  equilibrium,  and  –  if  so  –  how similar  is  it  to  the  one 
predicted  by  the  standard  model?  (For  example,  is  the  equilibrium  price 
different?) 
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(There is a more fundamental question of how the collection of consumers and firms 
that constitutes a particular market comes together in the first place; this is considered 
later.) 
4. The Investigation.
The evolution of those sets of rules was simulated in a series of multi-agent models. 
The agents are of two types: consumers (500 in each model) who are identical, and 
who seek  the  cheapest  sources  of  supply on  a  best-of-three-bids  basis;  and firms 
(initially  50)  acting  as  suppliers,  whose  technical  and  financial  endowments  are 
heterogeneous. 
Because the investigation concerns how a market price is established in the 
first place, the firms cannot be ‘price takers’ in the usual sense of reading the price 
from the market. Instead, they use rules to set asking prices in the light of market 
conditions, and/ or their commercial situations; and they revise these rules in the light 
of  their  impact  on  sales  and profits.  The  rules  are  expressed in  fuzzy logic  (FL) 
notation.  This  is  a  consistent,  rigorous  logic,  designed  to  formalize  the  human 
capacity of reasoning from qualitative and ambiguous information (see below). Firms 
are given the capacity to learn from experience, through a genetic algorithm (GA): 
this conserves rules that work well, and eliminates those that do not. (Firms start with 
sets of rules that are random but well-formed.)
The simulation was repeated on ten randomly-generated sample markets, each 
with  conventional  supply  and  demand  functions  (and,  therefore,  a  known  static 
equilibrium  price),  from  which  the  individual  supply  and  demand  functions  are 
generated.  For  each  market,  the  learning  process  was  repeated  for  six  treatment 
combinations, comprising of all combinations of the following: two types of market 
dynamics,  ‘simple’  and  ‘complex’  (see  below);  and  three  levels  of  risk,  low, 
moderate, and high3. (This is, of course, a standard factorial design, with two factors, 
3 Markets were generated by selecting a point in a box bounded by the quantities 0 and 100,000, and 
the prices 0 and 100 (arbitrary units), as the static equilibrium position, SEq. Random coefficients were 
chosen for quadratic supply and demand curves passing through SEq, subject to the requirements that 
the curves are monotonically increasing for positive supply and demand, and have price elasticities at 
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risk and dynamics, each at three levels, replicated ten times.) Each simulation allowed 
each agent, on average, to be modified by the GA twenty times; between each pass 
through the GA, firms were given a number of trading periods (usually 9) in which to 
accumulate experience of the performance of their current ruleset. 
The  ‘simple’  treatments  mimic  the  standard  model  of  perfect  competition 
(with the unavoidable exception of using the asking-price mechanism). The ‘complex’ 
treatments are more realistic; the firms only make one decision (the asking price), but 
they  have  to  manage  all  of  its  consequences,  including  plant  replacement  and 
cashflow. Firms can become bankrupt, and new firms can also enter the market if 
conditions are sufficiently attractive. In these treatments, both investment in plant and 
the birth of new firms lag behind the market signals that initiated them. It may now be 
helpful to look briefly at the principles of fuzzy logic and genetic  algorithms, but 
those  readers  who  are  familiar  with  these,  or  are  primarily  interested  in  the 
implications of this work, may prefer to return to Sections 4.1 and 4.2 later. 
4.1 Fuzzy Logic. 
A variable may be fuzzy for one of two reasons. Firstly, there may be no meaningful 
way of measuring it quantitatively (this is often true of the physical consistency or 
smell of substances, see, for example, [15]). Secondly, the processes that generate it 
may  be  so  complex  and  uncertain  that  there  is  no  way  of  singling  out  a  single 
numerical value as the ‘right’ one4 (as there would be for a long, clean series of data 
from a Gaussian distribution, for example). Fuzzy logic (FL) can process propositions 
about systems and data that are fuzzy for either of these reasons. It does this by using 
membership values (MVs), which say how good a member of some set it is. MVs are 
determined by membership functions (MFs), which take some input, measured on a 
support scale5, and convert it to a MV, which can range from zero (not a member at 
SEq in the range [0.5,1.5]. Demand risk was generated through an auto-regressive, moving-average 
disturbance, sufficient to create a coefficient of variation of profit of zero, 5% , and 10%, for the three 
levels. 
4 This would be the case if the relevant probability distributions have non-stationary statistics, and very 
thick tails. 
5 Support scales can be qualitative. Such scales are very useful, for example, for providing a 
transparent, challengeable basis for a set of qualitative rules or assessments; however, they are not 
needed here. 
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all)  to  one (full  and perfect  membership).  This  is,  of  course,  in  direct  contrast  to 
conventional logic6 (CL), which uses zero/ one truth-values that say whether or not an 
object or case is a member of a given set (e.g., whether or not Socrates is a member of 
the set ‘mortal beings’). 
Figure 1 shows a set of MFs, which, between them, span the entire range of 
interest of a particular variable – in the case shown, the amount of unsold product held 
by a hypothetical firm. (MFs do not have to be triangular, but this is computationally 
convenient in many applications; when they are, the three defining points are called 
keypoints. A set of MFs does not have to form a neat pattern, as in the Figure, either.) 
Each function defines a fuzzy set which contains everything to which the MF assigns 
a non-zero MV. 
6 Here, ‘conventional logic’ means two-valued logic, operating on mutually exclusive sets with precise 
boundaries. 
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Membership functions can be determined from: (i) special cases about which 
we have some theoretical knowledge; (ii) historical data; (iii) by calibrating the rules 
implicit  in  the  actions  of  experienced  operators;  or  (iv),  as  in  this  study,  by 
optimisation through learning. 
In  the  figure,  the  left-hand  function,  A (the  membership  function  for  low 
inventory),  assigns a  value of 1.0 to  zero inventory,  which is  thus identified  as a 
perfect  member  of  this  set.  (Perfect  members  are  sometimes  referred  to  as  type 
members,  particularly  if  they  are  used  to  define  the  set.  Often,  they  are  chosen 
because they correspond to a situation about which we have some special insight or 
theoretical knowledge; zero inventory is special in this sense because it corresponds to 
equilibrium  between  demand  and  production.)  As  the  actual,  observed  level  of 
inventory increases, its membership in the set low inventory decreases (it ceases to be 
a  member  at  all  at  forty  units),  while  it  becomes  a  better  member  of  moderate 
inventory  7 . As the actual inventory level rises from zero to forty units, the contribution 
of A to the overall response from a fuzzy ruleset will decrease, and that of B will 
increase, because of the nature of the fuzzy inference procedure, see below. 
In most applications, we are interested in a case’s joint membership of two (or 
more) fuzzy sets. The membership of, say, a given case in the fuzzy set low inventory  
AND high profit is the lesser of its memberships in  low inventory and  high profit, 
considered separately8. Like single memberships, joint memberships (such as ‘this is a 
case of low inventory AND high profit’) are propositions that can be more or less true; 
and how true is measured by the membership value. As in all logics, propositions can 
be used to express inferences, such as
if inventory is high and profit is very low  ,  
then the appropriate asking price is low. 
The first two clauses (‘antecedents’ in CL) are referred to as inputs in FL; and the last 
(the ‘consequent’), as output. For historical reasons, the consequent clause is usually 
be written ‘…then set asking price low’, and the whole structure is referred as a rule. 
7 The names of fuzzy sets, and of the corresponding membership functions, are given in underlined 
italic throughout.
8 ‘AND’ here operates in an analogous way to ‘AND’ in CL, where it selects the lesser of the truth 
values of two conjoined propositions.
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(Its output is, of course, also a fuzzy set, see below.) One such structure cannot, of 
course, determine the output of a set of fuzzy rules from a single set of input data. 
Because of the overlapping of fuzzy sets, a given case will normally activate more 
than  one  rule;  the  output  of  each  (active)  rule  is  a  modified  form of  its  output 
membership function, and the inference procedure is defined in such a way that the 
overall output is a single figure, determined by what is, in effect, a weighted voting 
procedure. The numerical value of each rule’s ‘vote’ is determined by the position of 
its output MF; but the weight of that vote is determined by how good an example the 
current situation is of the fuzzy set defined by the rule [16]. 
In CL, overlapping sets are forbidden9; any logic that is to embrace ambiguous 
and  qualitative  data  has  to  relax  this  restriction,  but  this  does  not  create  any 
fundamental problems [cf 17 with 18]. Conventional logic is actually a special case of 
the fuzzy variety [19]; and the inappropriate use of the former in the domain of the 
latter, tends to produce dramatic but erroneous conclusions10. An important example 
in the context of MSE is the claim that there can be no valid  logical basis for any 
interpersonal comparison of the satisfaction (or pain) experienced by individuals as 
the result of any act of consumption, or caused by any restraint on economic action – 
and therefore,  of course, no justification for measures that  seek to alleviate severe 
suffering among one set of individuals, by imposing relatively small pains on another, 
e.g., through taxation; see Box 1.  
In  the  study  described,  each  firm  had  a  set  of  fuzzy  rules  governing  its 
response to commercial/ market conditions. Each rule had two inputs, the levels of 
profit and inventory, and one output, the asking price. (Preliminary investigation had 
suggested that these two variables were the most effective pair.) The rulesets covered 
all combinations of 3 fuzzy levels of inventory and 5 fuzzy levels of profit, each set 
thus consisting of fifteen rules in all. 
9 By the laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle: nothing may be, say, both black and not-
black; and nothing may be neither black nor not-black. We do, of course, violate these extensively in 
everyday (fuzzy) reasoning. 
10 Bertrand Russell, in The History of Western Philosophy, remarked (of Hegel) that ‘the worse your 
logic, the more interesting the consequences to which it gives rise’.  
11
12
 
Box 1.
Fuzzy Logic versus Conventional Logic in Interpersonal 
Comparisons.
In conventional logic, if I assert that I can compare the pain of  M, whose right to buy 
caviar is circumscribed by taxation, with that of  N, who cannot afford medication to treat his 
daughter’s TB, I have to be prepared to defend my ability to make such comparisons in every 
case (less sardines for M, versus more gooseberry jam for N, and so on.) In CL, a pattern of 
reasoning  is  either  universally  valid,  or  universally  fallacious:  the  truth  of  an  argument  is 
guaranteed by its formal structure.  We can, for example,  infer from  All  men are mortal  and 
Socrates is a man that Socrates is mortal, solely because it belongs to the valid pattern:
All A are X…           N is an A…          therefore, N is X. 
The  caviar/  TB  example  is  problematic,  precisely  because  it  breaches  CL’s 
requirements for this kind of formal validity, and for its subject matter to consist exclusively of 
crisp  sets  (non-overlapping,  with  precise  boundaries,  and  whose  members  can  always  be 
classified with certainty). To justify my original assertion, and to base a case for redistribution on 
it,  CL would insist that I  can show that the following argument belongs to a valid pattern of 
reasoning: All severe suffering justifies redistribution… This is an instance of severe suffering… 
Therefore, it justifies redistribution, with each of the categories involved being crisp ones. (I am 
omitting some obvious qualifications here, to keep the example simple.) 
Clearly, I cannot do this. I would have to rely on evidence from my observation of the 
visible  behaviour  of  others,  my inferences  about  which  of  their  reactions  are  ‘normal’,  and 
introspection;  but  all  of  this  evidence  is  necessarily  fuzzy,  and  therefore  inadmissible  in 
conventional logic. (I cannot, for example, be certain – in the CL sense of deductive truth – that I 
am not  comparing someone who has a pathological  addiction to caviar with a psychotically 
unfeeling parent,  nor can I  exclude such cases by creating a non-crisp category of ‘normal’ 
individuals.) None of this is a problem in fuzzy logic, where categories that are not crisp and do 
overlap are valid, and where any claim I make about my ability to compare extreme levels of 
pleasure and pain in others, or to classify the reactions of individuals as ‘normal’ or otherwise, is 
an empirical matter. In CL,  form determines truth; in FL,  content determines truth; and a little 
reflection  will  confirm  that virtually  nothing  in  the  physical  and  social  worlds  can  meet  the 
requirements of CL – which, of course, is why we do not use it in everyday life.  
4.2 Genetic Algorithms.  
Finding out what rules intelligent, non-altruistic suppliers would adopt to survive and 
prosper  in  a  complex  marketplace  requires  some  means  of  optimising  complex 
objects, viz, the fuzzy rulesets. A genetic algorithm (GA) does this by mimicking the 
process of organic evolution11, in which the selection of novel characteristics leads to 
improved  adaptation.  (The  method  rests  on  an  analogy  between  strings  of  digits 
encoding  a  potential  solution  to  a  problem of  interest,  and  chromosomes,  which 
embody strings of genetic code.) Mutation is the best known of the novelty-producing 
mechanisms, but crossover – the process in which parental chromosomes are aligned, 
severed  at  corresponding  points,  and  then  re-connected  in  such  a  way  that  the 
offspring chromosomes receive a mixture of parental genes – is at least as important 
[20]. (The effects of evolution in natural, ‘wet’ genetics are vastly more complex than 
in this one-gene-one-function version [21]; and biological evolution does not appear 
to be in the business of optimisation.)  The algorithm consists of these steps: 
− create a population of strings, each encoding one possible (random) solution to 
the problem at hand (e.g., a set of rules for responding to changing external 
conditions); 
− implant each of these solutions in an agent; 
− see  which  strings  are  fittest,  by noting  which  agents  perform best  (in  this 
context,  the  natural  choice  for  a  measure  of  fitness  is  the  ability  to  make 
sustained profit);
− put the best of these strings into a simulated breeding programme, ensuring 
that the fittest strings contribute more ‘offspring’ to the next generation;
− implant these offspring in new agents, and repeat the two previous steps until 
some halting criterion is met (e.g., until profitability ceases to increase with 
successive generations). 
Under certain conditions (see below), the population of strings will converge onto a 
single,  learned,  optimal  form.  In this  case,  predefined membership  functions  were 
used for the input  membership  functions,  and a standard profile  was used for the 
11 Readers who have religious scruples about evolution should regard this as a case of a myth that has, 
in this case, produced a serendipitous effect.  
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output membership functions (OMFs), so that only fifteen decimal numbers had to be 
optimised (one for the central keypoint of each rule’s OMF). 
5. Findings. 
(i) In a separate trial, firms had been able to learn the asking price as a single number, 
rather than a set  of fuzzy rules; however,  under complex dynamics,  this  produced 
much lower levels of profit. Intelligent, self-regarding agents would therefore choose 
a strategy of dynamic, rule-based responses. 
(ii) Under simple dynamics, regardless of the level of risk, firms learnt, convergently, 
sets  of  rules  whose effect  was  to  drive  the market  price  to  the static  equilibrium 
level12. As long as the conditions for perfect competition – or a near approximation to 
them – are met, the FL/ GA combination produces, experimentally, the same result as 
the reasoning used in constructing the standard model of competitive markets. 
(iii)  Under  complex  dynamics,  firms  also  learnt  a  set  of  rules  that  took them to 
equilibrium.  This  is  somewhat  surprising:  nonlinear  systems  often  have  restless  – 
even chaotic – dynamics. (The significantly different feature here is the presence of 
intelligent agents, of course.) However, the equilibrium price was different from the 
classic  one,  by  an  amount  that  depended  on  the  level  of  risk;  the  percentage 
depression at each level was consistent across markets, with a 10% difference at the 
highest level. 
(iv) The standard arguments for the optimality of static competitive market equilibria 
in simple economic systems cannot apply in the corresponding dynamic equilibria in 
complex ones.  
(v) These equilibria  were also qualitatively different  from the classic  ones.  In the 
standard model, it is assumed that firms have already pushed their production up to 
the level at which price and marginal cost are equal, thus maximizing profits. Here, 
they learnt to aim below the classic (static) equilibrium price to avoid bankruptcy. 
Even the simple best-of-three-bids process efficiently allocated demand preferentially 
to  the  cheapest  vendors;  but  when  the  risk-generator  built  into  the  model  drove 
12 The correlation between the actual price at the end of a simulation and the corresponding theoretical 
(static) equilibrium price was over 0.99, across 10 markets, in which the actual equilibrium price varied 
by a factor of approximately 10.
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demand down, this often left firms at the top of the price ranking with no sales. A 
very small difference in absolute price between two firms could mean that one has a 
large  income,  while  the  other  has  none,  and  therefore  risks  bankruptcy;  a  firm’s 
ranking can also be changed by other firms adjusting their prices, of course.  (The 
same pattern of rules  results  when consumers  are  not allowed to  switch suppliers 
unless the price differential exceeds a certain minimum.) 
(vi)  Firms  learnt  to  use  rules  that  keep  the  market  stable.  This  is  a  significant 
derogation from economic rationality (ER). Actors are ER13 if  they always choose 
options that promise the maximum net benefit to self, assessed on the economic value 
current transaction only, i.e., they are materialist, non-altruistic and chronomyopic14. 
While  ER is  still  the  winning  strategy for  non-altruistic  agents  in  simple  market 
systems  (see (ii),  above),  this  is  not  true in  complex  settings,  where the vigorous 
pursuit of individual short-term advantage may modify the dynamics of the situation, 
to the disadvantage of all. 
(vii) Under all simple treatments, the ability of firms to learn was unaffected by the 
number  of trading periods  between successive  passes of the GA. However,  under 
complex dynamics, learning broke down completely with less than 4 trading periods 
between GAs. It appears that, in the complex case, the consequences of any particular 
strategy are more variable, and can only be evaluated adequately in a longer sample. 
6. The Potential of Genetic Algorithms.
In the 1990s, there was great optimism about the potential of GAs, and many simple 
applications  were  published  [22].  This  initial  optimism was  soon  replaced  by  an 
equally mistaken pessimism, when it was realized that, as problems get bigger, the 
number of generations and the population size required to solve them grows very 
rapidly, and eventually, this makes the method impracticable. It is possible to adopt 
more sophisticated genetic methodology, such as messy genetic algorithms (MGA), in 
13 For the sake of brevity, ‘ER’ is used for the noun, adjective, and adverb. 
14 Myopic tout court would be as accurate, as the short-sightedness does not apply solely to time, of 
course; and it is only possible to be ER if the expected outcomes of choices are predictable, which is 
not true of many complex situations. 
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which the coding structure of the strings – in particular,  their  length and how the 
variables are grouped together – is also allowed to evolve [23]. (There is still debate 
about what mechanism is responsible for the efficiency of GAs in general [24].)   
However,  it  is  also  possible  to  simplify  the  genetic  structure  of  a  given 
problem.  GA-based  methods  can  be  computationally  demanding  in  two  different 
ways.  Increasing the number of steps in the technical  processes involved (such as 
setting an asking price, adjusting plant capacity, calculating profit and cashflow, etc), 
results  only in a proportionate  increase in the computational  burden.  However,  an 
increase in the genetic size and complexity of the problem is more serious, because it 
leads to an increase in the computational burden that grows much faster than the size 
of  the  problem  (measured,  in  this  case,  by  the  number  of  independent  decimal 
numbers that has to be learnt). 
When the investigation was begun, an attempt was made to optimise all three 
keypoints of both input and output MFs, i.e., nine numbers per rule, for each of fifteen 
rules15,  making  135  in  total.  This  failed  consistently,  the  strings  converging  onto 
random formats, because of genetic drift; the root cause of this is  epistasis  [25], in 
which the quality of a solution is affected by the values at relatively widely-spaced 
loci. The nine numbers for each rule are spread out in sequence along the string, and 
the sever-and-interchange involved in crossover can therefore readily disrupt them; as 
a  result,  a  segment  of  a  good solution  that  has  been  assembled  by mutation  and 
crossover is likely to be promptly lost again. However, the tactic of using fixed input 
membership functions  and a standard profile for the output membership  functions 
meant that only a relatively short string of fifteen real numbers had to be learnt; and, 
because the overall response from a fuzzy ruleset is a weighted linear combination of 
the  responses  of  individual  rules,  these  numbers  can  be  learned  independently, 
precluding  the  possibility  of  epistasis  –  single  numbers  are  not  vulnerable  to 
disruption by crossover. 
GAs appear to be able to handle optimisation problems in which the agents 
belong to different groups (each heterogeneous) with conflicting interests [26]; and 
15 Five levels of profit, crossed with three levels of inventory, see above in main text.
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techniques to allow different strategies to evolve within a single population have been 
available for many years [27]. 
7. Other Impacts of Complexity on Mainstream Economics.   
7.1  Genetic  Methods  and  Motivation,  Altruism,  and  Professionalism  in  the 
Public Sector.   
The account so far has focussed on part – a very significant part – of the core of MSE; 
it is now time to turn to the latter’s halo of theories about motivation and institutions. 
A number of studies have been made of this, using various genetic methodologies, 
mostly  in  the  last  two  decades.  These  studies  create  very  serious  doubts  about 
economic rationality as a model of human motivation, the deficiencies being so great 
that ER cannot be treated as a reasonable approximation to the real world. (This is 
relevant to understanding the behaviour of economic agents in general, and actors in 
politics and the public sector in particular.) 
The  empirical  support  for  the  ER  model  was  never  a  strong  one;  and  it 
displaced  an earlier  series  of  models  with a much stronger  empirical  base,  which 
recognized and explained a wider range of phenomena. In those models, motivation is 
multi-dimensional  (rather  than solely a  response to  individual,  short-term material 
reward)  [28];  organizations  are  inherently  prone  to  conflicts  of  goals  and  values 
(rather than single-minded ‘rational  actors’, obeying a charter  set by their  owners/ 
sponsors) [29]; and most management and policy decisions are not well-structured 
ones (see below). (These models were a reaction to the defects of earlier ones that 
were  primarily  concerned  with  command  and  control,  in  environments  that  were 
technically,  psychologically,  and  culturally  simple  [30].)  The  change  cannot  be 
attributed to increased explanatory power; in part, it seems to have been a Kuhnian 
paradigm shift,  but  considerable  political  effort  and surprisingly large  amounts  of 
money have also been spent on promoting the MSE worldview [31, 32]. (The latter 
may go some way to explaining  the finding that,  even in fairly unequal  capitalist 
societies, there is a widespread belief that the existing distribution of wealth has some 
just/ fair basis [33].)   
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In our context, it is the notion that people are  exclusively  selfish (as distinct 
from operating with mixed motives) that is most significant; if this is true, no form of 
altruism can be expected in politicians or public servants – no professional ethics, no 
idealism, no tincture of commitment to the public good in the intentions of politicians 
and their appointees. These ideas take their purest form in public choice theory (PCT). 
This takes it as axiomatic that politicians will confect policies solely to sell them to 
the public  for votes,  thereby to  secure both the legitimate  and corrupt  benefits  of 
public  office,  so  that  the  overall  direction  of  public  sector  policy  is  inevitably 
distorted. 
This supposed effect is separate from the decrease in efficiency that is claimed 
to result from the absence of profit-driven owners – or their agents – in the public 
sector. (Orchard and Stretton offer an interesting critique of both sets of ideas, see 
[34].)  The  latter  belief  does  pose  problems  of  internal  consistency:  a  number  of 
financial  debacles  (including  the  current  ‘credit  crunch’)  have  had  their  roots  in 
competitive pressure within firms, leading to actions by individuals that are far from 
being  in  the  firm’s  long-term interest  (see  also [35]).  It  is  difficult  to  see why a 
dichotomy  between  what  the  organization  needs  and  what  motivates  individuals 
should lead to inefficiency in one setting (public sector), but not in another (private 
sector), given that the same range of management tools is available to both. 
PCT  and  related  approaches  are  based  on  two  beliefs:  that  economic 
rationality is necessarily a winning strategy for non-altruistic agents; and that humans 
will be conditioned by Darwinian forces to be economically rational. We have already 
seen that the first is wrong, because ER action can set off turbulence that imposes 
costs  on  all,  in  a  situation  in  which  free-riding  on  communal  self-restraint  is 
impossible16. This is consistent with earlier work by Axelrod [36] on the Prisoners’ 
Dilemma game (PD), in which two felons have individual incentives to betray the 
other to the authorities. These incentives (given certain conditions) drive them into a 
very damaging mutual betrayal, despite the existence of a much better collaborative 
solution, benefiting both equally, of supporting each other – a ‘paradox of rationality’. 
16 Any firm that seeks to exploit the communal self-restraint can only do so by putting itself at the top 
of the ranking by asking price – but that is the place of maximum danger.
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PD is  a much simpler  system than the complex markets  considered above,  and it 
imposes extreme simplifying conditions:  blind play17;  sequences of games of fixed 
length;  and  no  tentative  moves,  signalling,  or  knowledge  of  the  other’s  normal 
behaviour  gained  through  other  transactions.  The  surprising  thing  is  not  that  PD 
produces defection from coalitions that would be mutually rewarding; it is how small 
a relaxation of those conditions is required to restore sanity (and collaboration) – in 
Axelrod’s case, only the fixed-length sequences are done away with, and this led to 
the emergence of the famous Tit-for-Tat Strategy18. (In Brams’ Theory of Moves [37], 
it is relaxation of the blind play rule that disrupts the ‘paradox of rationality’.) Casti 
[38] and Axelrod [39] describe later work with GAs, which produces a richer variety 
of  behaviour:  selfish  agents  will  learn  to  play PD in a  way that  does  not  trigger 
persistent, mutually destructive retaliation; and, although they may still attempt minor 
exploitative  sequences  of  moves,  mostly  they  have  to  act  with  restraint  towards 
others, for fear of the reactions that would otherwise result. In these solutions, agents 
collaborate, but often, they do so grudgingly; they trust, but only provisionally; and 
they exploit, but with restraint. Like most of us, they display a mixture of selfishness 
and altruism. 
 
More recent work in theoretical biology is equally damaging to the pseudo-
Darwinian  argument  for  Homo  economicus.  This  work  shows  that  biological 
evolution has repeatedly led to the development of altruism [40, 41]. (In biology, this 
term refers to a sacrifice of fitness by one individual, to benefit one or more others. 
Mainstream  economists  often  seem  to  imply  that  ‘true’  altruism  requires  a 
disinterested intention to self-sacrifice in order to benefit others; and they attempt to 
explain  away  the  whole  phenomenon  by  showing  that  an  alternative  selfish 
explanation exists, the ‘warm glow’ that the altruist supposedly derives from his/ her 
actions. I am not aware of any attempt to confirm that this effect actually exists, or to 
explain  how  Darwinian  forces  would  produce  individuals  who  valued  it,  in  the 
absence of a heritable functional benefit arising from altruistic behaviour.) 
17 Players make their moves knowing the other’s repertoire, but not which tactic will be used in any one 
interaction. 
18 Trust the other in the first exchange, then, in subsequent interactions, repay collaboration with 
collaboration, defection with defection. 
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In many cases, altruism acts through empathy. In the opening passages of The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith attributes empathy solely to our ability to 
imagine  ourselves  undergoing  another’s  tribulations,  but  this  understates  the 
phenomenon’s  strength.  As we have seen,  the  inhabitants  of  any complex  system 
experience  strong  evolutionary  pressures  in  favour  of  mutually  accommodative 
behaviour,  and  the  results  of  this  –  a  degree  of  functional  empathy  –  have  been 
confirmed experimentally in a number of species [42]. The result of this pressure is 
that empathetic features are now built into our neurophysiology; for a non-specialist 
account of the mechanisms involved, see [43]. We do actually share, to a greater or 
lesser extent, the brain phenomena that accompany pleasure, excitement, and distress 
in others, and therefore, presumably, we also share the same mental phenomena. The 
idea that there is no ‘logical’ basis for interpersonal comparability is not only wrong 
about the logic of the situation (see Box 1): it also depends upon an inaccurate model 
of mental functioning. 
One  principle  links  all  these  cases:  ultra-simple  situations  favour  models 
whose agents are  ER; but even a  small  infusion of complexity  – or,  equally,  any 
relaxation  of  the  artificial  simplifications  –  favours  more  restrained,  collaborative 
strategies. In the purely biological cases, the damaging over-simplification appears to 
have been the assumption that individuals always form part of a single population, 
rather  than  belonging  to  groups  that  benefit  from altruistic  behaviour,  but  which 
periodically break up and re-form with different members. In the other cases, it was 
the  exclusion  of  any  repercussions  of  individual  agents’  actions  that  artificially 
favoured ER. 
7.2  The  Impact  of  Complexity  on  Theories  of  International  Trade  and 
Development. 
In the light of Sections 5 and 6, it seems reasonable to think that the combination of 
FL/ GA with simulation experiments should be capable of handling complex models 
in other areas of economic theory, particularly in the areas of trade and development. 
However, there are four distinct groups of difficulties with the widely-held idea that 
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freeing-up markets, domestically and internationally, will automatically improve the 
lot of the world’s poor, and the availability of GA/ FL does not affect them equally. 
(i) Internal criticisms.    As in the case of competitive markets, there are problems of 
internal  consistency  in  the  MSE  account  of  the  benefits  of  laissez-faire in 
international trade; Graham Dunkley has provided a good survey of these [44]. The 
most  serious of them concern the size and form of the benefits;  the interested (or 
sceptical) reader should consult Dunkley’s book. The ability to handle more realistic, 
complex models is likely to make these criticisms redundant. 
(ii) Dynamic weaknesses.  More fundamentally, mainstream theories of international 
trade  and development  inherit  the  weaknesses  of  competitive  market  theory.  The 
static equilibria on which both are based are simply assumed to exist, and they may 
not be reachable in a dynamic situation. Indeed, this must be the case: mainstream 
theorists  typically assume that the economies involved will  all  be operating at the 
limit of their current productive capacity, i.e., they have been pushed, by competitive 
forces,  to  their  respective  production  possibility  frontiers  (PPFs),  with  all  their 
constituent markets at the classic, static equilibrium. However, we have already seen 
that it is not in the interests of the firms in individual markets to behave in ways that 
lead to that state.  
GA/ FL does appear  capable  of  building  more  realistic  theory in  this  area 
(although doing so would obviously constitute  a  major  research programme).  The 
methodology may also be capable of illuminating the recurrent issue of how policy-
makers should respond to challenges, given that they are in a world of very imperfect 
markets – and, indeed, may be on a very unlevel playing field, if, for example, their 
country’s primary exports may have to compete internationally with the subsidized 
output of richer countries. (A substantial part of the current19 difficulties of the Doha 
trade negotiations has arisen through more prosperous nations attempting to continue 
to protect their own agricultural producers, while asking poorer ones to liberalize in 
other sectors [45].) In effect, this involves exploring which second-best options are 
likely to be no worse than  second-best. However, this issue is also very close to an 
important boundary, see Section 8, below. 
19 August 2008. 
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(iii) Origin of markets.   The problem of purely economic development will not be 
solved by the spontaneous appearance of markets in which producers make (or retail 
from existing sources) products for direct sale to consumers, in response to demand. 
Recent experience in Liberia illustrates this. In the aftermath of the civil war, petty 
trading  in  crockery,  soap,  tobacco,  etc  did  pick  up  spontaneously  in  response  to 
consumer demand. However, sectors in which sales for final consumption depended 
on  the  renewal  of  a  chain  of  economic  activities  did  not.  In  the  case  of  marine 
fisheries,  for  example,  there  is  a  good demand  inland,  and  the  various  means  of 
satisfying it appear to be potentially profitable. However, by the end of 2006, very 
few fish were being sold outside Monrovia,  and those were only being sold, on a 
small-scale, by hawkers.
 
GB Richardson identified two factors that account for this kind of tardiness 
[46]. Entrepreneurs may be reluctant to respond to new market opportunities, if they 
suspect that others are making similar, competitive investments that will lead to an 
excess  of  total  capacity.  They will  also be reluctant,  if  there  is  uncertainty  about 
whether others are making the complementary investments on which they must rely 
for  inputs,  services,  etc  (in  the  Liberian  example,  ice  producers,  canners  and/  or 
smokers,  suppliers  of  packaging,  refrigerated  transport  and  storage,  etc).  When 
investment does happen in such circumstances, it is almost inevitably followed by a 
costly shakeout of excess capacity. Developing economies cannot afford this; and it is 
nonsense (or worse) to suggest that there are sound theoretical or empirical grounds 
for believing that allowing either of the main possibilities (inaction or shakeout) to 
happen, is optimal,  or even simply better  than the modest state action of the kind 
Richardson suggests: the case simply has not been examined. 
He should perhaps have added that the factors that actually determine where 
entrepreneurs  put  their  money  are  usually  not  dominated  by  expected  return  on 
investment; this is largely for valid reasons concerned with rational decision-making 
in environments that are not merely risky, but uncertain (see below). And, of course, 
even if those decisions were dominated by the expected rate of return, entrepreneurs 
would  be  comparing  alternatives  across  many  sectors,  and  would  not  necessarily 
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choose  to  invest  in  all  the  activities  that  a  prudent,  long-sighted,  and  humane 
government would favour. 
(iv)  Income Distribution.     ‘Development’  implies  change  in  the  quality  of  life 
throughout  society,  and  it  is  difficult  to  see  how this  can  happen,  without  some 
considerable  improvement  of  the  material  circumstances  of  the  poor.  The  ‘trickle 
down effect’ can hardly be relied on to help them, even in the medium term [47]: it is 
considerably easier to raise GDP than to raise the relative incomes of those whose 
earnings lie in the bottom quintile, by relying on market forces and liberalization. It is 
difficult to see how any effective poverty alleviation strategy can avoid creating both 
gainers and losers, and the latter – including those who misperceive themselves as 
long-term net losers – may well resist the changes, through political and other means. 
Poverty is primarily a matter of distribution, in two senses. Firstly, there is the 
immediate inability of the poorest to buy food or health care, or to invest in education, 
because of the absolute level of their income. Secondly, markets and the private sector 
– unless regulated or persuaded by incentives – inevitably go where the money is, 
evolving over time to meet, preferentially, the needs of the richer sectors of society, 
i.e., there is also a problem of relative incomes. Now, there are aspects of distribution, 
as a purely economic problem, that are complex in the sense used here, and which 
appear to be amenable to methodology such as GA/ FL (for example, its dual nature, 
both an input to, and a consequence of, economic arrangements). However, there are 
other aspects that are political, and these lie beyond the boundary between that which 
can usefully be explored by economic model-  and theory-building, and that which 
cannot.  
8. The Limits to Theorization and Model-building. 
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8.1. Problem Structure and the Concept of Rational Decision. 
Simple  and  complex  situations  correspond  to  Mitroff’s  well-structured  and  ill-
structured domains,  respectively [48]. In the former case, effective conduct lies  in 
finding the best option, and implementing that; and, accordingly, methods for making 
a selection from a given list of options form an important part of the decision-maker’s 
toolkit in this context.  
However,  in ill-structured situations,  because of uncertainty and ambiguity, 
the nature of any problem, how to solve it, and what counts as a good solution are all 
open to dispute. In this domain, our effectiveness depends to a large extent on our 
skill  in  framing the problem at  hand in  a  potent  way,  in  applying  techniques  for 
creatively expanding the range of possible solutions open to us – and in managing our 
choice well, for here, the likelihood of unforeseeable consequences arising from our 
actions  is  always  relatively  high.  But  there  are  also  hyper-complex  situations,  in 
which  political  conflict  is  an  added ingredient,  i.e.,  there  is  conflict  about  which 
paradigm and  set  of  values  should  determine  the  allocation  of  rights,  duties,  and 
benefits  in  a  society.  These  correspond  to  Mitroff’s  wickedly-structured  domain, 
where  building  coalitions,  neutralizing  opponents,  gaining  control  of  resources, 
gaining control of critical posts and functions, moving disputes into more congenial 
forums, and moulding public opinion, are fundamental to effectiveness20. 
Both Keynes  and Knight  (see [5])  believed that people respond to genuine 
uncertainty (as distinct  from mere,  quantifiable  risk)  with some form of  irrational 
behaviour. This is an error, and it arises from the assumption that ‘rationality’ can 
only mean ‘economic rationality’  (in the sense explicated above). Given the richer 
understanding of rationality that grows out of the concept of problem structure, it is 
easier to see how rational decisions can still be made in circumstances in which the 
conditions and inputs required for ER simply do not exist; and the basis on which 
actors make reasoned choices in such situations may well be quite different from what 
they would rely on in the corresponding well-structured ones. For example, when an 
20 The most one can reasonably expect to achieve consistently is, of course, different in the three 
domains: achievement of short-range goals, attaining broad objectives, and furtherance of one’s 
fundamental values, respectively. 
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entrepreneur  has  to  make  an  ill-structured  choice  among  potential  investments, 
factors other than the prospective return on investment – which may be very uncertain 
– may dominate his/ her choice21. 
The  author  had  some  years’  experience  with  one  of  the  UK  Enterprise 
Agencies, working with the owners of small firms that were trying to diversify their 
portfolios of products. There, provided that the prospective return was judged to be 
broadly satisfactory, the final decision about a new product was usually determined 
by  considerations  of  prospects  for  growth,  the  possibility  of  dominating  a  niche 
market, or what would be easiest to manage if technical or marketing problems arose, 
rather than any fine comparison of expected returns. All the factors mentioned are, of 
course, partial determinants of the actual, realized returns; but all are also uncertain, 
and cannot generally be quantified in any meaningful way – rather, they provide a 
strategic  base from which to  confront  unexpected  threats  and opportunities  in  the 
future. Similar considerations apply in the context of R&D, where most significant 
choices are ill-structured or wickedly-structured; for a discussion of the principles of 
decision-making in the latter situation, see [49]. 
8.2 The Role and Limitations of Rational Decision in Development. 
Two rather  different  situations  illustrate  the issues  involved.  One is  the persistent 
problem  of  attempting  to  stimulate  economic  development  (accepting  that 
development has other, important dimensions that nevertheless depend on increased 
economic  activity).  The  other  is  the  type  of  problem currently  facing  some  rice-
exporting countries during a period of sharply increasing prices. If rice is both an 
important export and a staple item of diet, then export tariffs and restrictions will have 
many interconnected consequences of a purely economic nature. They will also affect 
different sectors of society (e.g., urban wage-earners and farmers) differently; and any 
political tensions that arise may affect government’s willingness and even its ability 
(in the face of widespread unrest, for example) to pursue its chosen policies. 
21 Note also that, in such cases, you cannot work back from the choice to determine what rate of return 
the entrepreneur ‘really’ expected: the data/ choice relationship is neither one-to-one nor invertible.  
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 In both these cases, more sophisticated methodology – to build basic theory, or 
to explore the technical aspects of the behaviour of complex economic systems – has 
an important role to play in informing political decisions. However, I suggest that the 
actual decision will, in virtually every case, have to be situation-specific, and involve 
compromises among desirable but mutually incompatible elements. In particular, the 
‘best’ choice will depend on the skills and the relative strength of the political assets 
of the decision-takers. This view conflicts with parts of the ‘Washington Consensus’ 
[50]  –  which  is  still  believed  in,  fervently,  by many of  the  staff  of  development 
finance agencies – that such choices are always objective ones, and there are always 
over-riding arguments in favour of maximizing market freedom. 
The technical weaknesses of the underpinnings of that consensus have already 
been outlined, but a sense that there is a strong philosophical case for market freedom 
persists. This opens up the vast field of ethics, and all that can be done here is to put 
forward  some  comments  on  the  sturdiest  arguments  of  two  of  the  best-known 
advocates of this position, Friedrich Hayek and Robert Nozick.  
(i)  Friedrich  Hayek remains  an  important  influence22.  He argues  that  coercion  is 
unavoidable in a planned society – as the only way of getting compliance with the 
plans – and that this will lead to a climate in which the ruthless self-seeker is likely to 
flourish, and will inevitably end in dictatorship, since this provides the most effective 
means of coercion [52].  His use of the phrase ‘planned society’ assumes that a very 
substantial  amount  of  centralization  has  already  occurred:  most  mixed  economies 
operate  on  negotiation,  of  one  form or  another.  He has  really  only  succeeded  in 
showing that a process of moral degeneration and increasing centralization of control 
is  likely  where  bureaucrats  already  have  very  wide-ranging  powers  and 
responsibilities, and operate in a system that provides no countervailing force to resist 
their supposedly relentless search for power – and that they actually desire power in 
the first place. (Some bureaucracies go the other way, of course, seeking an easy life 
for their members by  shedding responsibilities; see [53] for examples.) Hayek also 
fatally weakens his position by offering an explanation of why freedom is good: if the 
22 He was awarded the US Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1991, a year before his death. More 
recently, Jeremy Shearmur’s Hayek and After [51] gives a good critique of Hayek’s work, and also 
testifies to the continuing strength of his influence. 
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justification  for  rejecting  ‘coercion’  is  freedom,  and  his  justification  for  wanting 
freedom is  a particular  quality of life  – in which individuals  are able to use their 
mental powers to the full, and thereby make their full contribution to the community 
– then it is the latter that really matters. If there is some other way of attaining that 
quality of life, one that does not depend on freedom in his sense, then, surely,  he 
should be prepared to consider it.  
(ii) Robert Nozick put forward a number of arguments for minimalizing the role of 
the state. Central to these is his claim that there can never be any moral justification 
for ‘aggression’, which he defines as including any taxation beyond that required for 
the  minimal,  night-watchman  state  (introducing  an  element  of  circularity  into  his 
argument in the process). He justifies  this absolute ban by citing Kant’s categorical 
imperative, never to treat humanity simply as a means, but always to recognize that 
they are in themselves, ‘an end’ (i.e., they are rational, moral agents) [54]. 
However,  using the categorical  imperative in this  way radically distorts  its 
author’s intention. Kant believed that moral force derives from reason. We have moral 
precepts,  such  as  ‘do  not  cheat’;  these  can  be  applied  universally;  and  they  are 
binding,  because they admit  no  meaningful alternative.  If you try to invert  such a 
precept  –  so  that  you  might  get  ‘always  cheat’,  for  example  – the  result  is  self-
destructive:  in this  case,  if  the inverted version were applied universally,  the very 
concept of honest dealing would break down, and it would no longer be possible even 
to define the meaning of ‘cheating’23. According to Kant, our reason tells us what is 
right  –  but  it  is  our  will  that  makes  us  actually  do  what  is  right,  when  we  act 
‘autonomously’, with reason and will in harmony [55, 56]. Good will, therefore, has a 
very special status, and should be inviolate; but Kant acknowledges that we also act 
‘heteronomously’, e.g., in pursuit of physical pleasure, and it is entirely clear that he 
did  not  intend to  extend  this  special  status  to  that  sort  of  situation.  Whether  one 
accepts his arguments is irrelevant: even if they are correct, Nozick is misusing Kant’s 
conclusions.    
 
23 Kant has a different – and much looser – argument for precepts on which this one does not work, 
such as ‘do not neglect your talents’.     
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9. Conclusion.
9.1 The Current Status of Mainstream Economic Theory. 
The findings reported above on the behaviour of firms in complex competitive 
markets  (like  all  experimental  results)  need  confirmation.  If  they  stand,  and  the 
contention that the ‘complex’ treatments are a better approximation to reality than the 
model of perfect competition is accepted, then certain other results must fall. Firstly, 
competition among materialist, non-altruistic (but non-myopic) agents will not bring 
single-commodity  markets  to  the  classic,  static  equilibria,  so  that  the  standard 
arguments for the allocative efficiency of competitive markets do not apply; and the 
same is true of the standard arguments for believing that competition ensures that 
each factor of production receives its just reward, and that no one agent can have any 
incentive to ‘exploit’ another. 
Furthermore,  mainstream theories  of international  trade rely heavily on the 
assumption that economies operate at the production possibility frontier; but given the 
results reported in Section 5 on the behaviour of firms in individual markets, it is very 
difficult to see how this could be the case. If it is not, doubts are cast on the usefulness 
of those theories as sources of policy guidance,  and on claims that  indiscriminate 
market liberalization is the key to improving the lot of the world’s poorest people.
These considerations remove both the material and moral bases of thinking 
that unfettered competition should be the default choice for economic arrangements 
(and the philosophical case for libertarianism, as expressed by Hayek and by Nozick, 
is  not  a  strong  one).  They  also  leave  us  with  the  problem  of  managing  mixed 
economies. While there is a vast amount of practical experience on this (not all with 
impressive results, and some of it difficult to explain), we do not yet have a solid body 
of realistic theory in this area. Such theory should be able to guide us in identifying 
when intervention is  advisable  – because intervention  has both direct  and indirect 
costs,  and  these  can  be  heavy  –  and  in  identifying  the  type  and  intensity  of 
intervention needed. Producing such theory would be a very substantial exercise, and 
one that could reasonably be regarded as the acid test  of any school of ideas that 
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claims to offer a radically better way of ‘doing economics’. It is in the highest degree 
unlikely that any such body of theory would displace market forces from centre stage; 
but  it  is  increasingly  difficult  to  present  a  convincing  case  for  leaving  them 
completely unmanaged (and, indeed, no modern state actually does so). However, a 
managed,  mixed  economy  would  also  require  a  more  balanced  approach  to  the 
relative  roles  of  the  public  and  private  sectors,  supported  by  renewed  efforts  to 
understand organizations and institutions as complex systems, whose inhabitants have 
a variety of motivations (see Section 7.1).     
From  the  evidence  presented  above,  it  does  seem  that  many  of  the 
characteristic  features  of MSE (in  the broad,  two-component  sense used here)  are 
artefacts of simplifications that were originally made in the interests of mathematical 
tractability. These features include: the supposed stability and other benign properties 
of perfectly competitive markets; the existence of paradoxes of rationality;  and the 
inherent superiority of the private sector over the public sector. At the very least, this 
evidence shows that there is an alternative perspective that is worth exploring; some 
of the avenues for such exploration (and the robustness of the available navigation 
instruments) have already been discussed in the main text.  
9.2 The Prospects for Change. 
This  is  the  appropriate  point  to  clarify  the  word  ‘perspectives’  used  in  the  title, 
particularly in relation to ‘paradigms’. The work of Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, and 
Larry Laudan in this area can, I believe, be synthesized as follows. There are, indeed, 
opaque Kuhnian paradigms. These are visions of the ‘true nature’ of reality, shared by 
members  of  a  discipline,  that  are  so  compelling  that  any theoretical  or  empirical 
evidence suggesting that they are mirages is rejected (by various means), in order to 
justify continued belief in the vision [57]. The mental imagery of humans as member 
of the genus  H. economicus, is – among one set of economists – an example of a 
paradigm. 
Anyone who challenges such a vision of reality is putting forward something 
rather  more  in  the  nature  of  a  Lakatian  research  programme  [58]:  a  vision  of  a 
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sequence  of  problems,  placed  in  the  order  in  which  they  need  to  be  addressed. 
Lakatian research programmes are also exist in the real world; most (sub-) disciplines 
are demarcated by a paradigm – which their members take as a direct view of the very 
bedrock  of  reality  –  and  one  or  more  research  programmes,  all  of  which  their 
members share. The difference between a paradigm and one of these programmes is 
that  Lakatos  did  not  share  Kuhn’s  belief  in  the  impossibility  of  individual 
investigators  escaping from their  discipline’s  shared,  communal  vision of the true 
nature  of  its  subject  matter:  Lakatian  research  programmes  (RPs)  are  adopted, 
consciously and voluntarily, by the individual researcher24, who may switch back and 
forth between them. He also drew attention to the two types of criteria that working 
scientists use in making that choice: those they apply to established RPs (solidity and 
significance of actual achievements), and those they apply to new RPs (promise of 
solving intransigent anomalies). 
Laudan made two further significant contributions to the debate [59]. Firstly, 
he pointed out that anomalies may be tolerated, if they persist long enough, and if 
there is no alternative that is capable of doing all that the incumbent theory can do, 
and handling the anomaly as well. Secondly, he presented cases in which a dominant 
paradigm – and its image of reality – simply faded away, when changes in the wider 
intellectual culture (in which science is always embedded) eroded the credibility of 
that image.  
In effect, the alternative presented here is a research programme of Lakatos’ 
second sort,  i.e.,  one that is consciously advocated for its promise of dealing with 
anomalies and defects. The advocates of such a programme are usually aware of the 
hidden assumptions about ‘how the world really is’ that support whatever they are 
trying to replace; but, inevitably, they too have their own paradigmatic blind spots. 
The future of this particular research programme may well be affected positively by 
both  of  the  mechanisms  discussed  by  Laudan,  despite  the  massive,  continuing 
expenditure on promoting the mainstream perspective as true, and, indeed, the only 
honest and reasonable view of political  economy (see Note [32]). Firstly,  it  offers 
good  prospects  of  handling  the  present  subject  matter  of  economics,  while  also 
24 He did acknowledge that RPs could still contain mechanisms – ‘negative heuristics’ – that neutralize 
evidence against their own core assumptions. 
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dealing  with  the  important  issues  that  centre  on  the  simple/  complex  dichotomy. 
Secondly,  the  credibility  of  what  it  seeks  to  replace  –  MSE  –  is  likely  to  be 
undermined by the increasing dissonance between the simple systems view on which 
MSE is based, and the growing awareness of the complexity of natural  and socio-
economic systems that now forms part of the wider Western culture25. 
However,  forecasting in any greater detail  the future influence of this  new 
perspective  (and any achievements  it  may give rise  to) requires methodology that 
would enable us to ‘look into the seeds of time, and say which grain will grow, and 
which will not’. This we do not yet seem to have – not for complex systems, at any 
rate. 
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25 Most people, for example, have some idea of what ‘the butterfly effect’ refers to, and are awre of the 
concept of ‘tipping points’ in both the social and natural realms. 
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